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904 ESTATE OF MICHELETTI [24 C.2d 
[So F. No. 16884. In Bank. Sept. 22, 1944.] 
Estate of ARTURO MICHELE'l'Tl, Deceased. FOSCA 
PUCHEU, Appellant, V. BANK OF AMERICA NA-
TIONAL TRUST AND SAVINGS ASSOCIATION (a 
National Banking Association), as Executor, etc., Re-
spondent. 
[1] Perpetuities-Rule Against Perpetuities-Vesting Within Pe-
riod of Rule.-Where executory interests in remainder created 
by a will in favor of the issue of the testator's minor sons 
must vest, if at all, within lives in being at the time of the 
creation of the limitation, which is the time of the testator's 
death (Civ. Code, § 749), such interests do not violate the 
rule against perpetuities. This rule applies solely to remote-
ness of vesting. 
[2&.2b] Trusts-Express. Trusts-Partial Invalidity.-Executory 
interests created by a will in favor of the issue of the testa-
tor's minor sons, if invalid, did not vitiate other provisions 
of the will creating a trust for the benefit of said sons, where 
the interests limited to the sons' issue were separable from 
the interests created in said sons, and where the testator's 
intent to let the trust for these children stand had he con-
templated failure of the limitations to their issue could be 
inferred from the trust's purpose to 8'.lpport his minor sons 
and to withhold the remainder until they were capable of man-
aging it, and from the care used in selecting the .dispositive 
language for the beneficiaries of the trust, as distinguished 
from the lack of care in phrasing the executory interests. 
[3] Perpetuities-Suspension of Power of Alienation.-The statu-
tory rules against restraints on alienation have a beneficial 
purpose, but they are not punitive. 
[4] Wills - Validity-Partial InvaliditY.-Testamentary disposi-
tions that are otherwise valid are not necessarily invalidated 
by illegal limitations, and the testator's purpose must control 
so far as it reasonably can. 
[5] Id. - Validity - Partial Invalidity. - In order to ascertain 
whether a testator intended that a prior interest created by 
[1] See 20 Cal.Jur. 1034; 41 Am.Jur. 64. 
[2] See 25 Cal.Jur. 298. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Perpetuities, § 3; [2] Trusts, § 74; 
[3] Perpetuities, § 4; [4,5] Wills, § 305. 
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his will should stand if an attempted succeeding interest 
failed, consideration should be given to the language of the 
will, including the extent to which the use of the same phrase 
to define the duration of the prior interest and to attempt the 
creation of the succeeding interest is to be regarded as a 
mere economy of words in the creation of two independent 
or interdependent interests; the surrounding circumstances; 
the ineffectiveness of the succeeding interest; whether the 
testator or an attorney prepared the will; the testator's knowl-
edge or belief concerning the claimants on his bounty;. and 
the age of the testator and of the donees. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San 
Mateo County denying petition for partial distribution of a 
decedent's estate. Aylett R. Cotton, Judge.4-ffirmed. 
Bernard Nugent and John J. Taaffe for Appellant. 
J. W. Coleberd for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Arturo Micheletti died September 21, 
1940, at sixty years of age, leaving a net estate of $120,000 
and a will executed March 26, 1940. Surviving him were two 
adult children by his divorced wife,· a son, Otello Micheletti, 
and a daughter, Fosca Pucheu (the present petitioner), his 
second wife, 'reresa Piotti Micheletti, and two minor children 
by his seeond marriage, Arturo Amadeo Micheletti, born July 
24, 1928, and Manlio Elmo Micheletti, born April 8, 1930. 
The ~ill was admitted to probate. On June 10, 1941, appel-
lant filed her first amended petition for partial distribution 
of the estate and claimed $10,000 as heir at law, contending 
that the residuary bequest of her father's will creating a tes-
tamentary trust violated the rule agoainst perpetuities as well 
as the rule against restraints on alienation in sections 715,· 
716 and 771 of the Civil Code and was therefore void. From 
the order of the superior court denying her petition, appel-
lant brought this appeal. 
Although appellant's petition is directed solely at the va-
lidity of the trust of the residue, the other parts of the will 
as well as the testator's general plan are material to the con-
sideration of the problems presented. The testator's personal 
effects, household furnishings and automobiles are bequeathed 



















906 :rnSTATE OF MICHELETTi [24 C.2d 
and to "all of my children born of my present marriage 
after the date of this will and to those of them surviving me, 
and to the surviving issue of them predeceasing me by right of 
representation. " It will appear that this language is essen-
tially similar to the dispositive language in the trust of the 
resid1le set forth below. Mario Morosi, a son by a former 
marriage of decedent's second wife, is bequeathed $1.000. 
Appellant and her brother Otello are given indefeasible be-
quests of $2,500 each. In addition, Otello is the devisee of a 
parcel of real property, and a trust is created for his use with 
a eorpus of $40,000 to. provide him with monthly payments 
of $60 until his death, at which time the trust is to terminate 
and the balanee of the trust estate is to be paid into the t~s­
tamentary trust of the residue "created for my said childretl 
of my present marriage, and which said trust estate shall be 
disbursed in accordance with the trust estate for my said chil-
dren herein created for that purpose. " The provisions of tIll' 
will for the creation and termination of the trust are: 
"Tenth: All the rest, residue and remainder of my estak 
whether the same be real, personal or mixed, of whatever kind 
or character, and wherever the same may be situate, of which 
I may die seized or possessed, or in which I may have any 
interest or right of testamentary distribution or power of 
appointment at the time of my death, I hereby give, dC'visc 
and bequeath to Bank of America National Trust aud Saving's 
Association, a national banking assoeiation, in trust, never-
theless, for the use and benefit in equal shares to my sons, 
Arturo Amadeo. Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti, to 
all of my children born after the date of this my last will IlHd 
testament, and to those Qf them surviving me and to the sur-
viving issue of any of them predeceasing me by right of repre-
sentation. Said balance of said estate is to be held by said 
trustee, subject to. the uses, terms, conditions and limitations 
particularly set forth." 
Subdivision (a) provides for the "education, maintenance 
and supPQrt of such children ... Until such child shall have 
attained the age of twenty-five years .... " Subdivisio.n (b) 
provides for a present vested gift from the trust estate of 
$5,000 to eaeh of the minor sons with enjoyment postponed 
until they reach the age of twenty-one years respectively, sub-
ject to divestment by failure to survive the testatQr or by the 
Sept. 1944] ESTATE OF MICHELETTI 
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testator's surviving until the sons reach twenty-five years o.f 
age. 
" (c) The trust herein created for my said sons and their 
issue shall cease and terminate as to. one-half (112) thereo.f 
then remaining when my said children, Arturo. Amadeo. Mi-
cheletti and Manlio Elmo. Micheletti, o.r the survivo.r o.f my 
said SQns shall have attained the age o.f twenty-five (25) years. 
Upon the termination of that po.rtion of said trust by the 
happening o.f said event, viz., the attaining o.f the age o.f 
twenty-five (25) years by my said sons, o.r the survivo.r o.f 
them, one-half (112) of said trust estate then remaining shall 
be paid, delivered and conveyed in equal shares to said Arturo 
Amadeo Micheletti and Manlio. Elmo Micheletti, or to the sur-
vivor of them and to the surviving issue of either o.f them then 
deceased by right of representation; the one-half (V2) of the 
said trust estate then remaining to be held in trust in accord-
ance with the terms hereof until my said sons, Arturo Amadeo 
Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti, or the survivor o.f said 
sons shall have attained the age of thirty-two (32) years, 
when such trust shall cease and terminate and all the trust 
estate then remaining in the hands of the testamentary 
trustee shall be paid, delivered and conveyed in equal shares 
to said Arturo Amadeo Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Miche-
letti in equal shares, or to the survivor o.f them and to the 
surviving issue, if any, of either of them then deceased by 
right of representation. 
"(d) It is my will and I hereby declare that any children 
born of my present marriage after the execution of this will 
and the survivor or survivors of them, and to their surviving 
issue, if any, by right of representation, shall share in said 
trust estate to the same extent and in equal manner and in 
accordance with the same terms and conditions aR hcrein fixed 
and provided for my two designated sons, Arturo Amadeo 
Micheletti and Manlio Elmo Micheletti. 
"Eleventh: None of the beneficiaries herein designated or 
named other and except Fosca Pucheu, Otello Micheletti and 
Mario Morosi shall receive any part o.f my estate other and 
except the provisions herein specifically made for them until 
such beneficiary shall have reached the age of twenty-one 
years. 
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event, either jointly or severally sell, assign, transfer, convey, 
pledge, hypothecate or otherwise encumber his, her or their 
interest or interests under these trusts .... " 
[1] Appellant contends that the interests created in the 
issue of Arturo and Manlio by the terms of the trust in ar-
ticle X and the limitations placed thereon by articles XI and 
XII violate the rule against perpetuities and the prohibi-
tions against restraints on alienation in the Civil Code. It is 
nppellant's position that the rule against perpetuities is in 
force in this state by reason of article XX, section 9, of the 
California Constitution prohibiting perpetuities except for 
eleemosynary purposes and section 4468 of the Political Code, 
which makes the common law of England the rule of deci-
sions in the courts of this state insofar as it is consistent 
with the laws and Constitution of the state. There is con-
siderable uncertainty as to the soundness of this position 
(see 2 Simes, Law of Future Interest [1936], § 572, p. 473; 
Rest., Property [Group No.1], Proposed Final Draft No.5 
[1944], pp. 109-110), but it is unnecessary to determine that 
question in this case, for the executory interests created by 
the will in favor of the issue of the minor sons must vest, if 
at all, within lives in being and are therefore not within the 
operation of the rule against perpetuities, which applies solely 
to remoteness of vesting. Each son is given an equitable in-
terest in the trust property for years and a vested legal in-
terest therein in remainder subject to divestment by death 
before twenty-five years and to divestment of his share in 
the one-half of the corpus remaining if he should survive to 
twenty-five but die before thirty-two. These interests are 
prevented from merging by the interposition of the trust. If 
one son should die leaving issue surviving before reaching 
the age of twenty-five, the executory interest would vest in 
his issue subject to defeasance if the surviving son should die 
before reaching the age of twenty-tlve, or subject to divest-
ment as to one-half if the surviving son should survive to the 
age of twenty-five but should die before reaching thirty-two. 
Since the executory interests in remainder created in favor 
of the issue must therefore vest, if at all, within lives in being 
at the time of the creation of the limitation, which is here the 
time of the death of the testator (Oiv. Code, § 740) they do 
not violate the rule against perpetuities. (See Gray, Rule 
Sept. 1944] ESTATE OF MICIiEL1t'l'Tt 
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Against Perpetuities (4th cd.) § 201; 2 Simes, op. cit. supra, 
§ 496.) 
[2a] It has been suggested that the phrase in article XI 
"other and except the provisions herein specifically made for 
them" prevents that article from applying to any provision 
in the will, including article X, specifically made for any 
beneficiary and thus prevents a violation of the rule against 
restraints on alienation. (See Civ. Code, §§ 715, 716 and 
772.) It is unnecessary to pass on the soundness of this sug-
gestion or to determine whether the gifts to issue are invali-
dated by the limitations in articles XI and XII or whether 
they stand and the limitations only are rejected (see, Gray, 
The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed.) § 423, p. 437; Leach, 
Perpetuities In A Nutshell, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 638, 655), for if 
the interests in favor of the issue are invalid they are separa-
ble from the interests created in Arturo and Manlio. 
The leading case in this state setting forth the principle 
of separability is Estate of Willey, 128 Cal. 1, 11 [60 P. 471], 
which reduced the problem to a determination of the testa-
tor's intention pursuant to Civil Code, section 1317 (now 
Prob. Code, § 101), which provides that" ... A will is to be 
construed according to the intention of the testator. Where 
his intention cannot have effect to its full extent, it must have 
effect as far as possible." Applying this principle, the court 
formulated the rule that "valid trusts should not be disre-
garded because in the instrument creating them one particu-
lar invalid trust is d.,clared, unless the latter is so insepar-
ably blended with the others that it cannot be eliminated 
without destroying the main intent of the trustor, or working 
manifest injustice to the other beneficiaries." This principle 
has become a settled rule of decision in this court. (Estate 
of Fair, 132 Cal. 523, 532 [60 P. 442, 64 P. 1000, 84 Am.St. 
Rep. 70]; affirmed 136 Cal. 79, 81 [68 P.306]; Nellis v. 
Rickard, 133 Cal. 617, 620 [66 P. 32, 85 Am.St.Rep. 227]; 
Estate of Pichoir, 139 Cal. 682, 685-686 [73 P. 606] ; Sacra-
mento Bank v. Montgomery, 146 Cal. 745, 747 [81 P. 138] ; 
Estate of Oampbell, 175 Cal. 345, 351 [165 P. 931] ; Estate of 
Whitney, 176 Cal. 12, 19 [167 P. 399] ; Estate of Phelps, 182 
Cal. 752, 763 [190 P. 17] ; Estate of Van lVyck, 185 Cal. 49, 
62 [196 P. 50] ; Estate of Maltman, 195 Cal. 643, 654 [234 P. 
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of Gump, 16 Cal.2d 535, 547 [107 P.2d 17] ; see Rest., Prop-
erty [Group No.1] Proposed Final Draft No. 5 [19441, 
p. 111; Rest., Trusts [1936], § 65, comment d; Freund, Three 
Suggestions Concerning Future Intere~ts, 33 Harv.L.Rev. 
526, 531; Leach, Perpetuities In a Nutshell, 51 Harv.L.Rev. 
638, 656-657.) 
[3] The statutory rules against restraints on alienation 
have a beneficial purpose, but they are not punitive. 
[4] Testamentary dispositions that are otherwise valid are 
not necessarily invalidated by illegal limitations, and the tes-
tator's purpose must control so far as it reasonably can. 
(See Eaton v. Brown, 193 U.S. 411, 413 [24 S.Ct. 487, 48 
L.Ed. 730] ; Landram v. Jordan, 203 U.S. 56, 63 [27 S.Ct. 17, 
51 L.Ed. 88]; and Boal v. Metropolitan Museum of A.rt, 
[S.D. N.Y. 1923], 292 F. 303, 304; see, also, 27 Cal.L.Re-v:. 
86, 87; Freund, op. cit. supra, p. 533.) 
[5] It would hardly be possible to discover whether a 
testator actually intended that a prior limitation should 
stand if a subsequent limitation failed, for the testator would 
ordinarily not anticipate the partial ineffectiveness of his di~­
position. (See Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law 
[appendix VIII, 1909], § 702; Rest., Property [Future In-
terests, part 1 and 2, 1936], Introductory Note to chap. 16, 
p. 930, Monograph on Ineffectiveness of an Ultimate Execu-
tory Interest, appendix, p. 34.) Nevertheless, there must be 
rules governing testamentary dispositions that are partially 
ineffective. The objective of the rules formulated is to ascer-
tain what the testator would have intended had he foreseen 
a partial failure of his expressed plan. (Gray, op. cit. supra, 
§ 703; Rest., Property, op. cit. supra, p. 930.) Decisive weight 
is given the judicially construed intention of the testator. 
(Rest., Property, op. cit. supra, § 228.) Material considera-
tions are the language of the conveyance, including the extent 
to which the use of the same phrase or clause to define the 
duration of the prior interest and to attempt the creation of 
the succeeding interest is to be regarded as a mere economy 
of words in the creation of two independent or two interde-
pendent interests; the circumstances surrounding the disposi-
tion; the ineffectiveness of the attempted succeeding interest; 
whether the testator prepared the will or employed an at· 
torney to do so. and the apparent skill of the draftsman in 
the use of language or of legal phraseology; knowledge or 
Sept. 1944] ESTATE ()F MIOHELETTI 
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belief of the testator concerning the claimants upon his 
bounty, and the age of the testator and of the donees. (Prob. 
Code, § 105; Rest., Property, op. cit. supra, comment g; Rest., 
Property [Future Interest, parts 3 and 4, 1940] § 242 and 
comments, pp. 1199-1205.) 
[2b] The application of these principles to the facts of the 
present case leads to the conclusion that if the executory in-
terests in the issue of Arturo and Manlio were invalid, the 
testator would have preferred the trust to stand free of such 
interests. The purpose of the trust was to provide for the 
support and education of the children of the second marriage 
and to preserve the bulk of the testator's estate for the chi1~ 
dren until they were old enough to manage large sums of 
money. The repeated reference to Arturo ahd Manlio by 
name throughout the will, the fact that an attorney drafted 
the will, the gift to them of the remainder interests in the 
personal effects of the testator, their youth at the time the 
will was drawn, the age of the testator, and the amount of the 
testator's estate to go into the testamentary trust in relation 
to the gifts to appellant and Ote110 give rise to the inference 
that the minor sons were the special objects of the testator's 
bounty. The language and draftsmanship of the will 
strengthen this view. The care used in selecting the disposi-
tive language for the successors to the testator's personal ef-
,fects and the beneficiaries of the trust of the residue indicates 
an awareness of the rule against remoteness in vesting. It is 
in marked contrast to the lack of care in the phrasing of the 
executory interests, notably the failure to provide for the con-
tingencies of death of the children of the second marriage 
before the times for distribution of the trust estate. In these 
events the; testator would die intestate as to the bulk of his 
property. These factors indicate that the testator's first con-
. cern was for the children of his second marriage, and that 
had he contemplated possible failure of the executory limi-
tations to their issue he would have provided that the trust 
for these children stand. 
Appellant relies upon Estate of Whitney, supraj Estate of 
Van Wyck, supraj Estate of Maltman, supraj and Sheean v. 
Michel, 16 Ca1.2d 324 [57 P.2d 127], in opposing the rule of 
separability in the present case. In each of these cases, how-
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it would defeat the entire scheme and purpose of the testator. 
Thus, in Estate of Whitney, supra, at 19, the court prevented 
a result that would have been contrary to the testator's plan 
"and to which it cannot be supposed that he did consent or 
would have consented." In Estate of Van Wyck, supra, at 
pages 62, 63, the court did not countenance a separation of the 
invalid part of a trust from the valid part, for the benefici-
aries would then have owned the remainder and no purpose 
could be served by the interpositi:m of the trust. In the pres-
ent case the very purpose of the trust was to support the chil-
dren and to withhold the remainder until they were capable 
of managing it. The valid part of the trust in Estate of Malt-
man, supra, at page 653, was not allowed to stand because it 
would have resulted in defeating the testator's plan and was 
unfair to one of the beneficiaries. The trust was for the equal 
benefit of the testator's son and daughter, and if the other-
wise valid provisions had been preserved, the daughter would 
have received three-fourths of the estate and the son but one-
fourth, contrary to the testator's wishes. In Sheean v. Michel, 
supra, at 329, the court refused to make a separation that 
would have defeated not only the express purpose of the tes-
tator but also the claims of creditors. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., 
and Schauer, J., concurred. 
[So F. No. 17019. In Bank. Oct. 2, 1944.J 
SAM L. COLLINS, Petitioner, v. HARRY B. RILEY, as 
State Controller, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Legislature-Expenses of Members-Oonstruction of Statute 
Authorizing Rcimbursement.-Since all presumptions and in-
tendments are in favor of the validity and constitutionality 
of legislativo acts, and since such acts will be given a construc-
McK, Dig. References: [1,2,4,6] Legislature, § 68; [3] Consti-
tutional Law, § 2; [5J Public Officers, § l03&. 
Oct. 1944] COLLINS v. RILEY 
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tion consistent with validity if possible, it must be presumed 
that the Legislature in enacting that part of Pol. Code, § 352, 
which authorizes the payment of "actual necessary traveling 
expenses" to members of the Legislature, did not intend to 
increase the mileage allowance covered by Const., art. IV, 
§ 23, but only to provide reimbursement for a member's actual 
living expenses when attending a session of the Legislature. 
[2a, 2b] Id. - Expenses of Members - Oonstruction of Oonstitu-
tional Provision.-Const.,art. tv, § 23, which provides. that 
legislators "shall receive for their services" a stated sum "and 
mileage . . . not to exceed five cents per mile," does not ex-
pressly prohibit the allowance of other expenses, and the doc-
trine of expressio unius est exclusio alteriuB cannot be relied 
on to support or incorporate additional restrictions' so as 
to render invalid Pol. Code, § 352, insofar as it authorizes 
paymcnt of traveling expenses to the legislators. The con-
stitutional provisions for payment are limitations on the 
amounts which may be allowed for the purposes specified, 
and the doctrine of expressio unius can only operate to exclude 
additional limitations, thereby leaving the Legislature free to 
act. 
[3] Oonstitutional Law - Legislature - Extent of Powers.-The 
state Constitution is not a grant of power but rather a limita-
tion or restriction on the powers of the Legislature. Such 
restrictions and limitations are to be construed strictly, and 
are not to be extended to include matters not covered by the 
language used. 
[4] Legislature-Expenses of Members-Validity of Statute Au-
thorizing Reimbursement.-Pol. Code, § 352, insofar as it au-
thorizes the payment of traveling expenses to each legislator, 
does not constitute an improper increase in the compensation 
provided for by Const., art. IV, § 23, since the state's repay-
ment of such expenses is not the giving of additional compen-
sation, but merely a reimbursement to the legislator for actual 
cash outlays necessarily incurred for maintenance while away 
from his home in the performance of his duty. (Conflicting 
language in Oounty of Placer v. Freeman, 149 Cal. 738, 87 P. 
628, and in Oounty of Santa Barbara v. Bucker, 35 Cal.App. 
676, 170 P. 860, disapproved.) 
[5] Public Officers-Oompensation and Expenses-Traveling Ex-
penses.-When an officer is required to travel in order to per-
form his duty, the payment of his actual necessary living 
expenses while away from home is a proper item of state ex-
[3] See 5 Oal.Jur. 666; 11 Am.Jur. 619. 
[6] See 43 Am.Jur. 154. 
